Bondi v. VanDerStok
Opinion March 26, 2025 – Ruling 7-2
In Bondi v. VanDerStok, the Court upheld a 2022 Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives’ (“ATF”) regulation treating ghost guns and unfinished frames or receivers as “firearms” under the Gun Control Act of 1968.[1] The plaintiffs brought a facial challenge arguing that the kits did not meet the law’s definition of a firearm and should not be subject to federal regulation.[2] However, the Court highlighted that certain ghost gun kits and unfinished frames qualify as being “readily convertible” to firearms.[3] Therefore, these ghost guns and unfinished frames meet the definition of a firearm and may be lawfully regulated.[4] The Court emphasized that the ATF rule need not be valid in every application, only that it reasonably applies in some cases.[5]
FDA v. Wages and White Lion Investments
Opinion April 2, 2025 – Ruling 9-0
In FDA v. Wages and White Lion Investments, the Court unanimously upheld the Food and Drug Administration’s (“FDA”) denial of applications to market flavored e-cigarette products, ruling that the FDA’s decision was not arbitrary nor capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act.[6] This case arose after the Fifth Circuit had set aside FDA orders denying applications to market these products, holding that there were arbitrary changes in the FDA’s standards.[7] Writing for the Court, Justice Alito found that the FDA’s shifts from earlier guidance were justifiable and sufficiently explained in the statutory mandate of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009.[8] Justice Alito emphasized that courts must defer to agency expertise and avoid substituting judicial judgment for that of the agency.[9] The Court vacated and remanded the Fifth Circuit’s ruling with instructions to apply a harmless-error analysis.[10]
Barnes v. Felix
Opinion May 15, 2025 – Ruling 9-0
In Barnes v. Felix, the Court overruled the Fifth Circuit’s “moment-of-threat” test that narrowed the time period for evaluating excessive force claims under the Fourth Amendment.[11] In Barnes, a police officer pulled over the plaintiff to conduct a traffic stop that ended with the officer jumping on the vehicle’s doorsill and firing two fatal shots to his head.[12] The Fifth Circuit had limited the timeline of its review to approximately two seconds when the officer stood on the vehicle’s doorsill, and failed to consider the preceding facts, such as the officer’s conduct up to that point.[13] Ultimately, Barnes underscores that the Fourth Amendment cannot be limited to specific timeframes, and instead, the totality of circumstances must be considered in evaluating excessive force claims.[14]
Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth
Opinion June 5, 2025 – Ruling 9-0
In this case, the Court unanimously rejected a heightened standard for plaintiffs who are party of a majority group, such as heterosexual employees, when establishing a prima facie case of discrimination based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”).[15] After Marlean Ames (“Ames”), a heterosexual woman, filed a suit against the Ohio Department of Youth Services for discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, the district court held, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed, that Ames lacked evidence of “background circumstances” necessary to establish her prima facie case.[16] Writing the opinion for the Court, Justice Jackson explains that the plain text of Title VII prohibits discrimination against “any individual” because of a protected characteristic despite whether the individual is a member of a majority or minority group.[17] Based on this analysis, the “background circumstances” rule imposed an additional burden on plaintiffs in majority groups that is inconsistent with the statute.[18] Additionally, the Court held that the “background circumstances” rule undermines the long-standing McDonnell Douglas framework, which allows Title VII cases to rely on indirect evidence, by requiring plaintiffs in a majority group to present very specific types of evidence in order to prove “background circumstances.”[19]
Smith & Wesson Brands v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos
Opinion June 5, 2025 – Ruling 9-0
The Court in Smith & Wesson Brands v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos considered a suit brought by the Mexican government against several United States gun manufacturers for facilitating illegal gun trafficking to Mexican drug cartels.[20] In its unanimous ruling, the Court held that the suit brought by the Mexican government was barred by the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (“PLCAA”), which prohibits certain lawsuits against gun manufacturers.[21] The Court was unpersuaded by the argument that the suit falls under the “predicate exception” which requires that the plaintiff show the defendant aided and abetted a violation of federal gun laws.[22] To show that a defendant aided and abetted the violation of a law, the plaintiff must show that the defendant took specific and intentional actions to commit the legal act.[23] Here, Justice Kagen writes for the Court, that Mexico’s claims against the gun manufacturers offers only a “general accusation” that the manufacturers “assist some number of unidentified rogue gun dealers” in firearm sales which violate “various legal bars.”[24] Mexico’s argument does not offer any specificity or intentionality by the manufacturers to aid and abet violations of the law and, therefore, does not fall under the predicate exception and is effectively barred by the PLCAA.[25]
United States v. Skrmetti
Opinion June 18, 2025 – Ruling 6-3
In United States v. Skrmetti, the Court upheld Tennessee’s Senate Bill 1 (“SB 1”), which bans puberty blockers and hormone treatments for transgender minors, holding that SB 1 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.[26] Plaintiffs argued that SB 1 should trigger heightened scrutiny because it discriminates based on sex and transgender status.[27] However, Chief Justice Roberts explained the Court believed the law’s classifications were based on age and medical purpose, and thus, SB 1 was only subject to rational basis review.[28] The Court emphasized that they have “never suggested that mere reference to sex is sufficient”[29] to raise the level of scrutiny and therefore felt that the Court should defer to the legislature’s policymaking role.[30] In the dissent, Justice Sotomayor argued that this holding allows lawmakers to disguise obvious sex-based discrimination under the guise of neutral categories, thereby undermining the protections of the Equal Protection Clause.[31]
Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization
Opinion June 20, 2025 – Ruling 9-0
In 2004, a group of United States citizens who were injured, along with the families of those killed, sued the Palestine Liberation Organization (“PLO”) and the Palestinian Authority (“PA”) under the Anti-Terrorism Act.[32] After a jury awarded damages to the plaintiffs, the Second Circuit vacated judgment because, it held, U.S. courts lacked personal jurisdiction over the PLO and PA.[33] Congress later passed the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act (“the Act”), which provides that the PLO and PA consent to jurisdiction in the U.S. courts if they make payments to families of terrorists or engage in certain activities in the United States.[34] Despite the district court having found that the PLO and PA had made qualifying payments after the Act’s enactment, the Second Circuit ultimately again vacated the judgment after holding that the consent provision violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.[35] In a unanimous decision authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court overturned the Second Circuit’s decision and held that the provision is constitutional.[36] The Court reasoned that the federal government’s broad authority over foreign affairs allows Congress to tie jurisdiction to conduct that directly implicates U.S. interest, and that the statute narrowly targets specific entities while giving clear notice of the consequences of their actions.[37]
McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates v. McKesson Corp.
Opinion June 20, 2025 – Ruling 6-3
In this case, the Court considered whether the Hobbs Act requires district courts to automatically follow agency interpretations after two chiropractic clinics sued the McKesson Corporation (“McKesson”) for sending unsolicited fax advertisements, which they claimed violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”).[38] Throughout litigation, McKesson defended itself by relying on prior Federal Communications Commission (“Commission”) interpretations of the TCPA and arguing that the Hobbs Act required the district court to follow such interpretations.[39] However, the Court disagreed with this understanding of the Hobbs Act. The Court held that district courts are not bound to accept the Commission’s interpretations and may independently determine the meaning of the statute.[40] Writing for the majority, Justice Kavanaugh explains that there are three categories in which statutes authorize pre-enforcement review: (1) those which expressly preclude judicial review in subsequent enforcement proceedings; (2) those which expressly authorize judicial review in subsequent enforcement proceedings; and (3) those which are silent.[41] The Court found that the Hobbs Act falls into the third category and held that when a statute is silent the default rule is that a district court must independently review the agency’s interpretation.[42] The Court explained that it has long recognized a presumption of judicial review over agency actions and that such a presumption is codified in the Administrative Procedure Act.[43]
Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic
Opinion June 26, 2025 – Ruling 6-3
After the South Carolina governor removed any provider offering abortion services from the state Medicaid program, Planned Parenthood South Atlantic and Julie Edwards, a Medicaid beneficiary who received care from Planned Parenthood, sued seeking to block the governor’s executive order.[44] The lawsuit largely relied on the concept that the “any qualified provider” provision of the Medicaid statute confers a private right upon a Medicaid beneficiary to choose their provider and the governor’s action violates that right.[45] With Justice Gorsuch writing the majority opinion, the Court disagreed with Planned Parenthood and Edwards and held that there is no private right stemming from the statute.[46] The Court explained that the federal statutes can only create rights in “atypical cases” and to prove such a right there must be “rights creating terms” within the statute.[47] By way of example, the Court contrasted the relevant Medicaid provision with the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act, which the Court had previously determined there to be “rights-creating language” and further demonstrated the lack of such language in the “any qualified provider” language.[48]
FCC v. Consumer’s Research
Opinion June 27, 2025 – Ruling 6-3
FCC v. Consumer’s Research was a highly anticipated case involving the nondelegation doctrine. Following the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress directed the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) to maintain a Universal Service Fund (“USF”) where telecom companies contribute proportionally based on revenues.[49] The Universal Service Administrative Company (“USAC”), a private corporation, helps manage the USF.[50] Consumers’ Research challenged Congress’s delegation to the FCC and argued that the FCC is improperly subdelegating its authority to USAC.[51] The Court held that Congress provided sufficient guidance to the FCC in specifying who the programs must serve.[52] Further, the Court held that USAC’s role in managing the fund is constitutional because the FCC retains final decision-making authority.[53] Ultimately, this case hinted that the Court is unlikely to reintroduce the arguably dormant nondelegation doctrine anytime soon.[54]
Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton
Opinion June 27, 2025 – Ruling 6-3
In Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton, the issue was Texas’s H.B. 1181, which required websites where one-third or more of its content could be classified as “harmful to minors” to engage in an age verification process before allowing users to access the site.[55] After the passage of the law, but before its enactment, plaintiffs sued, alleging that H.B. 1181 would violate their First Amendment rights.[56] The district court held that H.B. 1181 was unconstitutional under a strict scrutiny analysis; however, the Fifth Circuit reversed, applying rational basis review.[57] The Court disagreed with both lower courts and found that intermediate scrutiny was appropriate because the law only incidentally burdens adult access to protected speech.[58] The Court upheld the law because Texas has an interest in protecting children from sexually explicit content, and the interest is tailored through industry-standard methods of age verification.[59]
Kennedy v. Braidwood Management
Opinion June 27, 2025 – Ruling 6-3
In Kennedy v. Braidwood Management, the Court considered whether agencies under the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) that implement the Affordable Care Act (ACA) were constitutionally structured.[60] The ACA requires private insurers to cover certain preventive care services based on recommendations from three HHS Agencies, including the United States Preventive Services Task Force (“USPSTF”), the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (“ACIP”), and the Health Resources and Services Administration (“HRSA”).[61] On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that USPSTF was unconstitutional because it was structured inconsistently with the Appointments Clause’s requirements.[62] In Kennedy, the Court held that the USPSTF is constitutional because USPSTF members are inferior officers since they are appointed and controlled by the Secretary of HHS.[63]
Mahmoud v. Taylor
Opinion June 27, 2025 – Ruling 6-3
In Mahmoud v. Taylor, a group of parents challenged the Montgomery County Board of Education’s (“Board”) decision to remove the option for parents to opt-out their child out of reading LGBTQ-inclusive books.[64] The parents argued that the Board violated their First Amendment right to free exercise of religion.[65] The majority held that the policy forced parents to choose between allowing their children to be exposed to materials the parents found religiously objectionable or bear the burden of seeking new or alternative education.[66] The Court held this imposed an unconstitutional burden on religious practices and found no compelling government interest that was strong enough to qualify the denial of opt-outs.[67] Writing for the dissent, Justice Sotomayor argued that mere exposure to differing ideas does not equal a free exercise violation and warned that allowing widespread opt-outs based on individual beliefs could lead to a tumultuous public education system.[68]
Trump v. Casa
Opinion June 27th, 2025 – Ruling 6-3
Trump v. CASA, Inc. arose after President Trump issued Executive Order No. 14160 (“Executive Order”), which restricted birthright citizenship for certain individuals born in the United States.[69] This Executive Order prompted numerous lawsuits with plaintiffs arguing that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause and the Nationality Act of 1940.[70] In response, three federal district courts implemented a nationwide preliminary injunction in an attempt to block enforcement of the Executive Order.[71] On June 27, the Court ruled that the district court federal judges had exceeded their authority by issuing these nationwide injunctions against President Trump’s Executive Order.[72] Justice Barrett explained that under the Judiciary Act of 1789, courts may only extend injunctions to provide complete relief to the actual plaintiffs, and may not go beyond.[73] Further, the Court also noted the lack of historical support for universal injunctions and the high risks of ignoring the procedural safeguards that are brought about in class actions.[74] While the Court did not address the constitutionality of President Trump’s Executive Order,[75] the Court limited judicial power by restricting relief to only the parties before the court. In the dissent, Justice Sotomayor argued that restricting courts from utilizing universal injunctions could lead to a wide array of widespread constitutional harms being unaddressed in a court of law.[76]
[1] Bondi v. VanDerStok, 145 S.Ct. 857 (2025).
[2] Id. at 865-66.
[3] Id. at 876.
[4] Id. at 876.
[5] Id. at 876.
[6] Food & Drug Admin. v. Wages & White Lion Inv., 145 S.Ct. 898 (2025).
[7] Id. at 915.
[8] Id. at 925.
[9] Id. at 928.
[10] Id. at 930-31.
[11] Barnes v. Felix, 145 S. Ct. 1353, 1359 (2025).
[12] Id. at 1356.
[13] Id. at 1357.
[14] Id. at 1359.
[15] Ames v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs., 605 U.S. 303 (2025).
[16] Id. at 307-08.
[17] Id. at 310.
[18] Id.
[19] Id. at 311.
[20] Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 605 U.S. 280, 284-85 (2025).
[21] Id. at 298.
[22] Id.
[23] Id. at 291.
[24] Id. at 294.
[25] Id. at 298.
[26] United States v. Skrmetti, 145 S.Ct. 1816 (2025).
[27] Id. at 1829.
[28] Id. at 1829-30.
[29] Id. at 1829.
[30] Id. at 1837.
[31] Id. at 1884.
[32] Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Org., 606 U.S. 1, 7 (2025).
[33] Id.
[34] Id. at 8.
[35] Id. at 9-10.
[36] Id. at 25.
[37] Id. at 16.
[38] McLaughlin Chiropractic Assocs., Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 606 U.S. 146, 150 (2025).
[39] Id. at 152.
[40] Id.
[41] Id. at 153-55.
[42] Id. at 155.
[43] Id.
[44] Medina v. Planned Parenthood S. Atl., 145 S. Ct. 2219, 2227 (2025).
[45] Id. at 2234.
[46] Id. at 2239.
[47] Id. at 2233.
[48] Id. at 2234-35.
[49] FCC v. Consumers’ Rsch., 145 S. Ct. 2482, 2493 (2025).
[50] Id. at 2492.
[51] Id. at 2495.
[52] Id. at 2517.
[53] Id.
[54] Id. at 2518.
[55] Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Paxton, 145 S. Ct. 2291, 2299 (2025).
[56] Id. at 2297.
[57] Id. at 2316.
[58] Id.
[59] Id. at 2319.
[60] Kennedy v. Braidwood Management, 145 S. Ct. 242, 2439 (2025).
[61] Id.
[62] Id. at 2441.
[63] Id. at 2463.
[64] Mahmoud v. Taylor, 145 S.Ct. 2332 (2025).
[65] Id. at 2349.
[66] Id. at 2359.
[67] Id. at 2363-64.
[68] Id. at 2397.
[69] Trump v. Casa, Inc., 145 S.Ct. 2540 (2025).
[70] Id. at 2549.
[71] Id. at 2549.
[72] Id. at 2600.
[73] Casa, Inc., 145 S.Ct. at 2560.
[74] Id. at 2555-56.
[75] Id. at 2550.
[76] Id. at 2582.