Trump v. Anderson
Opinion March 4, 2024 – Ruling 9-0
In this case, the Court rejected Colorado’s attempt to bar former President Donald Trump from running for another term under Section 3 of the 14th Amendment, which prohibits insurrectionists from holding office and ruled that the states may not bar the former president from running for another term.[1] The Supreme Court had never addressed the scope of Section 3 and the Colorado Supreme Court decision, which disqualified former President Trump from the state’s primary ballot, noted that “we travel uncharted territory.”[2] The Court did not address whether or not Trump had engaged in insurrection and focused solely on the question of whether states can determine constitutional qualifications for federal office.
Sheetz v. County of El Dorado
Opinion April 12, 2024 – Ruling 9-0
In a property-nerd reboot, the Supreme Court re-affirmed that exactions, also known as conditional permits, are unconstitutional when not particularized to the property at issue, and cannot be made constitutional via legislative action.[3] An exaction is when the government conditions building permits on, as exemplified here, the property owner compensating the government for things like increased road traffic associated with the construction.
In Sheetz, El Dorado County, a small county outside Sacramento, conditioned the petitioner’s building permit on his payment of $23,000 to the county as a “traffic impact fee.”[4] The petitioner sued the county under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, which requires the government use taken property for a public benefit and “justly compensate” the owner for their property.[5] Under the Court’s Nollan-Dolan Test, conditional permits become an unconstitutional taking when they are either unrelated to the government and property owner’s land-use interests, or disproportionately excessive to those land use interests.[6] Reversing the California Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that legislative exactions have always been recognized as Fifth Amendment takings, and on remand, the county must prove the traffic impact fee was proportional to the actual traffic impact and that the fee is related to the county’s interest.[7]
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Community Financial Services Association of America
Opinion May 16, 2024 – Ruling 7-2
In this case, the Court considered the method of funding for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“the Bureau”) and whether it violated the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution.[8] The Appropriations Clause states that, “no money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law.” The Bureau was created after the Financial Crisis of 2008 as part of the Dodd-Frank Act and draws its resources from the Federal Reserve.[9] The Bureau is financed by the interest on securities it holds and gains from securities transactions and fees. This unique funding mechanism differs from other agencies, which are mostly funded by annual appropriation. Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, stated that “Under the appropriations clause, an appropriation is simply a law that authorizes expenditures from a specified source of public money for designated purposes.”[10] He continued that “the state that provides the bureau’s funding meets these requirements,” and therefore the Bureau’s funding mechanism does not violate the Appropriations Clause.[11] If the Court had decided against the Bureau, the ruling may have called into question every regulation and enforcement action the Bureau has taken since its creation.
Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP
Opinion May 23, 2024 – Ruling 6-3
Racial gerrymandering challenges have become a perennial feature of the Roberts Court docket, and Alexander was the 2023 term’s headliner. The NAACP challenged a South Carolina electoral map alleging that it diluted the number of Black voters in certain districts–an automatic Equal Protection Violation.[12] The Court decided otherwise, finding that the number of Black voters in the district at issue was unchanged from the previous map.[13] Building on prior caselaw upholding politically motivated gerrymandering, the Court concluded that the record only shows a partisan, not racial, purpose and effect.[14] Without evidence of racially discriminatory intent or impact, the new map did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
NRA v. Vullo
Opinion May 30, 2024 – Ruling 9-0
The government cannot threaten corporations for their associations with ideological groups. After the Parkland, Florida school shooting in 2018, the New York Department of Financial Services (“the DFS”) privately and publicly called on corporations to stop doing business with the National Rifle Association (“the NRA”) because of the NRA’s pro-Second Amendment activism.[15] Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice Sotomayor said the government “cannot wield [its] power . . . to threaten enforcement actions against [regulated entities] in order to punish or suppress the NRA’s gun-promotion advocacy.”[16]
Reversing the Second Circuit, the Court found the NRA “plausibly allege[d] . . . a First Amendment violation.”[17]Coerced speech is a well-founded cause of action under the First Amendment, and the court has consistently held government officials responsible when they attempt to coerce, rather than persuade, private entities from engaging in First Amendment-protected activity.[18]
FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine
Opinion June 13, 2024 – Ruling 9-0
The Alliance of Hippocratic Medicine sued the Food and Drug Administration (“the FDA”) after the agency approved mifepristone, a drug used to induce abortions.[19] The respondent, a collection of pro-life healthcare associations and some individual doctors, sued, alleging three theories to establish standing: (1) by having to prescribe mifepristone, the doctors would suffer injuries of conscience, (2) that mifepristone is dangerous, and healthcare companies would have to divert resources to take care of potential victims of future side effects, and (3) the organization has a strong interest in the issue, which is enough to establish standing.[20]
The unanimous court rejected the respondent’s arguments, concluding that the respondents did not have standing to bring their challenge.[21] Justice Kavanaugh, writing for the majority, rejected the first argument on the grounds that federal law already protects physicians’ rights of conscience, allowing physicians to avoid care they morally oppose.[22] The Court also rejected the second argument, stating that the causal link between the FDA’s approval and potential side effects was not yet established. The respondent would have to wait for a harmed plaintiff or provide greater evidence that mifepristone would harm patients.[23] The third argument was rejected because organizational standing still requires individuated harm, which the respondent did not prove.[24]
Garland v. Cargill
Opinion June 14, 2024 – Ruling 6-3
After the 2017 Las Vegas concert shooting, the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms banned bump stocks under the National Firearms Act of 1934, which prohibits private ownership of automatic machineguns.[25] Bump stocks are an after-market gun accessory for semiautomatic guns that allows the shooter to bump fire, a technique where the shooter uses the recoil of the gun to shorten the time in between trigger fires more easily.[26] The Court struck down the regulation 6-3 on raw textual grounds, holding that the National Firearms Act defined a machinegun as a gun that fires multiple times with only “a single function of the trigger.”[27] Although bump stocks make it easier to fire more rounds with a semiautomatic gun, each shot still requires a separate “function of the trigger.”[28] Therefore, bump stocks are not machine guns under the National Firearms Act.
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson, interpreted the National Firearms Act differently, arguing that “When I see a bird that walks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, I call that bird a duck.”[29] The dissent cited an implied original intent behind National Firearms Act, that the drafters of The Act would have banned a device allowing a similar fire rate to a machinegun had they known such a device would exist.[30]
Cargill shows how the Court grapples with statutory interpretation. The majority preferred their textualist interpretation over the dissent’s statutory intent analysis, which is consistent with Roberts-Court statutory interpretation trends.[31] In general, the Court has preferred textualism when interpreting statutes, and intent or original public meaning analyses when interpreting the Constitution.[32]
United States v. Rahimi
Opinion June 21, 2024 – Ruling 8-1
The Court in Rahimi ruled that a federal law restricting gun ownership for people subject to domestic violence restraining orders does not violate the Second Amendment because similar laws banning dangerous persons from possessing firearms existed in the Founding Era.[33] In 2022, the Court struck down a New York law enacting limits on carrying guns outside of the home in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen.[34] The standard from Bruen required judges to assess restrictions on gun rights by examining early American history and resulted in a subsequent expansion of gun rights.[35]This decision in Rahimi helped to define the scope of the Text, History, and Tradition test from Bruen.[36]
Murthy v. Missouri
Opinion June 26, 2024 – Ruling 6-3
In 2021, the Biden Administration influenced social media companies to censor posts about the COVID-19 pandemic.[37]Two states and five individuals sued Vivek Murthy, the United States Surgeon General, among other government employees and agencies, alleging that the petitioners coerced social media companies to censor the respondents’ content.[38]
In their second high-profile standing case of the term, the Supreme Court found the respondents had no Article III or statutory standing to challenge the Biden administration’s influence on social media companies.[39] Generally, the federal government cannot coerce social media companies to censor speech, but they can influence or persuade social media companies into censoring content on their own.[40] Respondents’ standing argument failed here because they did not allege sufficient facts to show the government was the cause-in-fact of each individual instance of content censoring.[41]
Moyle v. United States
Dismissed June 27
The Court dismissed a case from Idaho that temporarily allowed women to receive an abortion when their health was at risk.[42] The decision reinstated the lower court injunction that paused the state’s near total abortion ban.[43] Before this case, the Court had not considered a state law criminalizing abortion since the decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization in June of 2022, which overturned 50 years of precedent under Roe v. Wade, eliminating the constitutional right to abortion.[44] A decision on the merits in this case could have influenced similar restrictions in over a dozen other states.
Ohio v. Environmental Protection Agency
Opinion June 27, 2024 – Ruling 5-4
Ohio v. EPA concerns a proposed rule from the Biden administration known as the “good neighbor” plan, which would have required factories and power plants in Western and Midwestern states to cut ozone pollution that spreads into Eastern states.[45] Ohio, Indiana, and West Virginia, with the support of several energy companies and trade organizations – challenged the “good neighbor” plan in the Court of Appeals in Washington D.C. The Court suspended the plan while the Federal Court of Appeals considers the matter. Justice Barrett’s dissent wrote that “the court’s injunction leaves large swaths of upwind states free to keep contributing significantly to their downwind neighbors’ ozone problems for the next several years.”[46] The Court’s decision to affirm the injunction pending litigation is one of many recent rulings that limits the EPA’s authority to address pollution and climate change.
Harrington v. Purdue Pharma
Opinion June 27, 2024 – Ruling 5-4
A narrow majority held that liability releases stemming from a bankruptcy proceeding cannot be entered into without outstanding creditors’ consent.[47] When a company files for bankruptcy, it must enter into a court-approved plan to pay back the company’s creditors.[48] Here, the respondent tried to convince the Bankruptcy Court to shield them from any lawsuits arising out of the cause of bankruptcy, arguing that they did not need the creditors’ consent to do so.[49] The Supreme Court rejected that argument, holding that the bankruptcy code has no provision allowing a bankruptcy judge to include nonconsensual liability releases in the bankruptcy plan.[50]
SEC v. Jarkesy
Opinion June 27, 2024 – Ruling 6-3
In a boon to defendants and a blow to administrative agency adjudication, the Supreme Court ruled that the defendants in Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) civil penalty proceedings cannot be deprived of their Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury.[51] The 6-3 decision along ideological lines applied a quasi-Text, History, and Tradition test, and concluded that SEC fraud charges were similar enough to common law fraud to trigger Seventh Amendment protections.[52] Jarkesy is just one in a docket unusually full of merits decisions regarding the very nature, structure, and powers of executive agencies.
Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo; Relentless v. Department of Commerce
Opinion June 28, 2024 – Ruling 6-3
In Loper Bright, the Court limited the power of executive agencies by overruling the longstanding 1984 legal precedent found within Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council.[53] Until Loper Bright, Chevron required the courts to defer to agencies’ reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutory language.[54] Under Loper Bright, the power of interpretation shifted from agencies back to Congress and to judges. Justice Kagan noted in her dissent that “in one fell swoop” the court has given “itself exclusive power over every open issue – no matter how expertise-driven or policy-laden – involving the meaning of regulatory law.”[55]
Fischer v. United States
Opinion June 28, 2024 – Ruling 6-3
In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that prosecutors may not use a federal obstruction statute to charge a rioter involved in the attack on the Capitol on January 6, 2021.[56] The 2002 law used to charge the rioter and named petitioner, falls under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and makes it a crime to “otherwise” corruptly obstruct, influence, or impede any official proceeding.”[57] The Court ruled that the Justice Department misused this 2002 law which was intended “to safeguard investors in public companies and restore trust in the financial markets following the collapse of Enron Corporation.”[58]The prosecution in the case argued the petitioner obstructed an official proceeding by disrupting the certification of President Biden’s electoral victory and attempting to destroy evidence.[59] Justice Jackson, who voted with the majority, wrote separately in concurrence that this case “[was] not about the immorality” of the acts taken place on January 6th, but instead the scope of the crime under Sarbanes-Oxley.[60] She continued, “There is no indication whatsoever that Congress intended to create a sweeping, all-purpose obstruction statute.”[61] The Fischer ruling has the potential to impact hundreds of other prosecutions related to the January 6th attack.
City of Grants Pass v. Johnson
Opinion June 28, 2024 – Ruling 6-3
In Grants Pass, the Supreme Court upheld ordinances in Oregon banning homeless residents from sleeping outdoors.[62]The Court ruled that the city’s bans did not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.[63] The relevant bans penalize sleeping and camping in public spaces, including sidewalks, streets, and parks.[64] Justice Gorsuch, writing for the majority, wrote that these bans did not target or criminalize the homeless, but the act of camping outdoors.[65] This decision will likely influence future actions taken by major cities to clear their homeless population from public spaces.
Moody v. NetChoice
Opinion July 1, 2024 – Ruling 9-0
When assessing a facial challenge on First Amendment grounds, the Supreme Court reaffirmed in Moody that courts must evaluate whether a “substantial number” of the law’s applications are unconstitutional.[66] The law at issue here was identical in the two defendant states, Texas and Florida, requiring social media companies to moderate their platforms in specific ways.[67] NetChoice, a nonprofit tech-freedom litigation group, filed two facial challenges alleging First Amendment violations. The court held that the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits both analyzed the facial challenge too narrowly and remanded for proper facial challenge analysis.[68]
Trump v. United States
Opinion July 1, 2024 – Ruling 6-3
On July 1, the Supreme Court ruled that President Donald Trump is entitled to partial immunity from criminal charges that he plotted to overturn the 2020 election.[69] Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, stated that former President Trump has presumptive immunity for his official acts and that a trial judge must separate official and unofficial acts at a later date and assess whether or not the protective presumption can be overcome.[70] The chances that this case will go to trial before the election become increasingly slim.[71]
[1] Trump v. Anderson, 601 U.S. 100 (2024).
[2] Anderson v. Griswold, 2023 CO 63, ¶ 7.
[3] Sheetz v. Cnty. of El Dorado, 602 U.S. 267, 271 (2024)
[4] Id. at 272.
[5] U.S. Const. amend. V.
[6] 602 U.S. at 274-75.
[7] Id. at 276, 280.
[8] Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Community Financial Services Assn. of America, Ltd., 601 U.S. ___ (2024).
[9] Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R.4173, 111th Cong. (2010).
[10] Trump, 601 U.S. at 5.
[11] Id.
[12] Alexander v. South Carolina Conf. of the NAACP, 144 S. Ct. 1221, 1233, 1238 (2024).
[13] Id. at 1249.
[14] Id. at 1252.
[15] NRA of Am. v. Vullo, 602 U.S. 175, 182-83 (2024).
[16] Id. at 187.
[17] Id. at 191.
[18] Id. at 180.
[19] FDA v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 376 (2024).
[20] Id. at 386.
[21] Id.
[22] Id. at 387.
[23] Id. at 390.
[24] Id. at 395
[25] Garland v. Cargill, 602 U.S. 406, 411, 412 (2024).
[26] Id. at 411.
[27] Id. at 410.
[28] Id. at 411.
[29] Id. at 430 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
[30] See generally id., at 431-37 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
[31] See generally Katie Eyer, Disentangling Textualism and Originalism, 13 Con L. Now 115 (2022) (noting that statutory and constitutional interpretation often require different interpretive methods).
[32] See id.
[33] United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. ___ (2024).
[34] New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022).
[35] Id.
[36] Id.
[37] Murthy v. Missouri, 144 S. Ct. 1972, 1982.
[38] Id. at 1984-85.
[39] Id. at 1997.
[40] See e.g. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 72 (1963) (differentiating between government pressure and government suggestion).
[41] 144 S. Ct. at 1997.
[42] Moyle v. United States, 144 S. Ct. 2015 (2024).
[43] Id.
[44] Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 597 U.S. 215 (2022).
[45] Ohio v. Environmental Protection Agency, 144 S. Ct. 2040 (2024).
[46] Id. at 24.
[47] Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 219 L. Ed. 2d 721, 740-41 (2024).
[48] Id. at 728.
[49] Id. at 731.
[50] Id. at 740-41.
[51] SEC v. Jarkesy, 144 S. Ct. 2117, 2130 (2024).
[52] See id. at 2130-31.
[53] Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024).
[54] Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837.
[55] Id.
[56] Fischer v. United States, 144 S. Ct. 2176 (2024).
[57] 18 U.S.C.S. § 1512(c)(2).
[58] Lawson v. FMR LLC., 571 U.S. 429 (2014).
[59] Fischer, 144 S. Ct. at 2185.
[60] Id. at 2194.
[61] Id.
[62] City of Grants Pass v. Johnson, 144 S. Ct. 2202 (2024).
[63] Id.
[64] Id. at 2214.
[65] Id.
[66] Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 144 S. Ct. 2383 (2024).
[67] Id. at 2393.
[68] Id. at 2408-09.
[69] Trump v. United States, 144 S. Ct. 2312 (2024).
[70] Id.
[71] Id.